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Double-dip or prolonged recessions have far-reaching consequences on household 
debt, often distinct from an ordinary brief single-dip recession. Firstly, after the 
exhaustion  of  households’ asset  buffers  during  the  first-dip recession,  and  when 
unemployment hits more mortgage-exposed parts of the population, the second-dip 
recession  can  trigger  a  second  and  potentially  more  important  wave  of  non-
performing loans. Secondly, household debt reduction weighs significantly on the 
aggregate demand and triggers a vicious debt-deflation cycle, further deepening the 
recession  and  preventing  households  from  reducing  their  debt  levels  to  more 
sustainable  levels.  Effective  and  swift  solutions  are  technically  and  politically 
difficult to introduce due to the current institutional and political context, but they 
are  vital  in  order  to  achieve  sustainable  household  credit  markets  in  Europe’s 
periphery and beyond. 
Against the background of record-high unemployment and decreasing prospects of swift 
recovery, the focus of financial markets has recently shifted towards the sustainability of 
European household debt and its potential effect on financial and economic stability. The 
number of non-performing loans (NPLs) is rising throughout the European periphery and 
housing  loans  are  slowly  but  surely  following  the  upward  trend.  While  household 
deleveraging continues rather successfully in the United States and in other countries of the 
EU, such as United Kingdom and Denmark, Europe’s periphery appears to lag behind in 
reducing its debt exposure. 
This  rather  objective  statement  of  delayed  deleveraging  could  immediately  provoke  a 
commonsensical  judgment:  Households  in  some  European  countries  are  simply  not 
deleveraging  quick  enough  and  their  efforts  should  be  increased.  In the  current context, 
however,  such  conclusion  is  misguided  and  potentially  dangerous.  The  household  debt 
situation  in  southern  Europe  combined  with  the  sluggish  recovery  presents  two  distinct 
dangers, which have to be analysed and dealt with carefully. 
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Firstly, there is the danger that the double-dip or a prolonged recession will exhaust asset 
buffers  accumulated  during  boom  times.  Unemployment  can  increasingly  hit  older 
population groups with formerly stable employment who are the most exposed to housing 
loans and who tend to present lower rates of unemployment during short-term crises. If 
recovery does not come in time to help such households cope with their debt burdens, the 
second dip of a recession can trigger a potentially more dangerous wave of defaults, which 
would increasingly concern long-term housing loans rather than just short-term consumer 
credit. It can further increase the amount of NPLs and have destabilising or even cliff effects 
on the already-weakened financial sector and ultimately on public finance. 
Secondly, in countries where significant government and business deleveraging is occurring 
simultaneously and where recovery is sluggish or non-existent, as is the case throughout the 
European periphery, persistent reduction of household debt could become the straw that 
breaks the camel’s back. Household debt deflation has thrown countries into a self-feeding 
spiral of persistently decreasing aggregate demand, falling consumer confidence, sluggish 
investment, capital flight, higher deficits, tax hikes and further budget cuts.  This vicious 
circle  partly  explains  the  development  of  the  multiplier  of  fiscal  cuts  recently  revised 
upwards by the IMF.1 
This commentary argues that  time matters in the household deleveraging cycle and that a 
swift recovery is its vital part. The second-dip recession in Europe’s periphery has created a 
poisonous mix that further threatens the financial system and the economy. Moreover, this 
paper tries to assess the extent to which these effects may have already materialised and 
evaluates the risks for countries where they are not yet fully felt. It also offers a theoretical 
policy response towards a more sustainable household credit sector and overall economic 
recovery. 
Phasing of regular household deleveraging 
During brief recessions, banks’ short-term consumer-credit assets (including overdrafts and 
credit card debt) suffer first and most abruptly among household credit products both in 
terms of defaults (see Figure 1) and volumes (Figure 2). 
Firstly, in case of unexpected or abrupt loss of income, instalments of consumer loans may 
become too high relative to income due to short maturities. Even a relatively small overall 
principal sum of consumer credit can be too difficult to sustain during a recession. Consumer 
credit  is  significantly  less  collateralised  than  mortgages  and,  despite  a  large  variance  of 
personal default laws across the EU, a default on a consumer loan is generally easier both to 
administer and to endure than a foreclosure.2 
Secondly, due to the limited principal sum and short maturities, households are generally 
more prone to fully repay new consumer credit in shorter periods and consequently take less 
credit to their income, thus adjusting to new perceived sustainable debt levels. 
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Figure 1. Ratio of 12-month stocks of charge-offs to stocks of all loans to 
households 
 
Note: The charge-offs constitute a proxy for default rates but are in no way equivalent, since OFIs 
can adjust their expectations to higher write-offs (explaining relatively low levels in the second 
dip). Sources: European Central Bank, Eurostat and ECRI. 
Figure 2. Annualised moving quarter real growth rates of household debt 
in Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal 
 
Sources: European Central Bank, Eurostat and ECRI. 
However, the levels of consumer-credit indebtedness are not unsettling and its flexibility is 
less prone to provoke large effects on the banking sector as is the case in housing loans. At its 
peak in 2009, consumer credit represented just above 13% of household debt in the euro area, 
while housing loans represented 72%. Consumer credit thus corresponds to a mere 7% of 
bank loans to the non-financial sector.3 
Households  can  also  rather  easily  reduce  their  demand  for  consumer  credit ,  since 
consumption can be postponed without serious repercussions on the  standard  of living. 
Asset buffers, such as savings for other purposes, can also be used to bridge  a temporary 
income decrease until the expected recovery   kicks in, thereby  adjusting  household  cash 
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flows and asset-to-income ratio to revised income expectations. Overall, due to low levels of 
stock of consumer loans, such a reduction in the consumer credit portfolio has a limited 
effect on the quality of banks’ assets and on the aggregate demand, despite relatively high 
charge-offs in initial periods of crises. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, retrenchment of consumer credit in Europe’s periphery during the 
recent crisis preceded the reduction in housing and other loans. The real amount of housing 
loans  merely  stagnated  until  the  end  of  the  Great  Recession.4  The  effective  shift  of 
deleveraging  to  housing  loans  became  predominant  during  the  short  recovery  and 
subsequently during the second-dip recession (Figure 2), mainly due to  longer maturities 
and higher  sums of  principal. Gradually expiring longer maturities enable households to 
effectively start to transfer their deleveraging efforts from consumer credit to housing loans, 
contracting for less new loans and thus decreasing debt exposure more significantly than in 
the initial stage of the crisis. 
On an ordinary  time-line  of household debt cycle ,  this  period of shifting  deleveraging 
towards housing loans is also the moment when recovery arrives and supports households 
in their efforts, effectively allowing them to partly  grow out from their leverage and adjust 
their  indebtedness  to  newly  revised  perceived  sustainable  levels.5  Indeed,  although 
deleveraging in the household sector usually starts during a recession, the most significant 
quantitative part of the debt reduction occurs during the subsequent recovery. 
When recovery does not come or does not last, however, adjusting leverage to   revised 
sustainable levels is still expected but becomes less realistic and, more importantly, adds to 
the downward slope of the economy. Such forced deleveraging weighs heavily on household 
spending, depresses consumer confidence and aggregate demand, thus reducing medium-
term investment and economic output. In this way, households’ debt-reduction efforts risk 
deepening the double-dip and contributing to cyclical unemployment . 
Household debt during the second dip 
While the second-dip recession could be perceived as a separate story, it has a number of 
specific attributes, which render an even mild second recession potentially more dangerous 
with respect to household debt than a severe but distinct single-dip recession. 
Firstly,  the  second-dip  recession  has  serious  implications  on  uncertainty  and  therefore 
consumer  confidence.  During  the  Great  Recession,  many  households  were  able  to 
temporarily  tighten  their  belts  rather  effectively,  expecting  a  rather  early  recovery  and 
therefore  increased income  in  the  medium-term.  When  the second-dip came  to  Europe’s 
periphery,  these  expectations  –  encouraged  by  economic  forecasts  –  have  been  proved 
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wrong. The recovery became ever more distant and uncertain, creating among households 
and businesses fear of a lost decade or a depression. This explains why consumer confidence 
is now lower than during the Great Recession and decreasing to historical lows in Greece 
and Portugal (see Figures 5 and 6). 
Secondly, expectations of a short-lived crisis enabled households to bridge their income gap 
through  consuming  their  asset  buffers  (see  Figure  3),  thereby  cushioning  the  welfare 
repercussions  of  the  first-dip  recession.  This  could  partly  explain  the  low  ratios  of  non-
performing loans in Spain and to a lesser extent in Portugal. However, if the recession lasts 
for too long and asset buffers get exhausted, the capacity to deleverage becomes limited. The 
pace  of  income  reduction  can  even  surpass  the  pace  of  debt  reduction.  Households  can 
reduce  their  debt  burdens,  but  their  ratio  of  outstanding  debt  to  disposable  income,  i.e. 
leverage,  and  therefore  relative  cost  of  the  debt  burden  can  rise  or  stagnate,  which  has 
necessarily a knock-on effect on the amount of NPLs. 
Figure 3. Net savings (current euros per capita) 
 
Sources: Eurostat and ECRI. 
During  the  recent  economic  crisis,  the  return  or  persistence  of  the  recession  in  Europe’s 
periphery created an effective gap between the pace of debt reduction and the leverage. This 
decoupling  has  been  the  most  flagrant  in  Greece,  where  households  were  effectively 
decreasing their debt from early 2009 but as shown in Figure 5, their leverage continued to 
rise until the end of 2011. This phenomenon was less pronounced in Spain (Figure 4), mainly 
due to the brief recovery in 2011 and much milder second-dip recession. The effect has not 
significantly surfaced in Ireland, which went through a similar housing bubble as Spain, but 
maintained growth in times when other countries dipped into a second recession, helping it 
to offset such effect rather quickly. 
In the Greek case, however, the economy was shrinking far quicker than the real stock of 
household debt, leaving households with unsustainable amounts of debt, triggering extreme 
and increasing levels of default rates (Figure 7), and amplifying the effects of debt deflation. 
This decoupling of leverage and real debt occurred roughly a year after the crisis began. 
More importantly, the rates of non-performing loans have not stalled as was the case in 
Spain, which registered a short-lived return to growth.  
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Figure 4. Household debt in Spain   Figure 5. Household debt in Greece 
   
Figure 6. Household debt in Portugal 
 
Note: The graphs have been adjusted so that the value of real debt and disposable income intersect at the start of the recession. 
Sources: ECB, Eurostat, ECRI and European Commission. 
Such a decoupling was not present following the Great Recession in other regions with high 
household indebtedness, which encountered only a brief or no second-dip recession. Mainly 
thanks to the increased disposable income during the aftermath of the crisis, households in 
the  United  States  and  the  United  Kingdom,  for  instance,  have  been  able  to  reduce 
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significantly their leverage to disposable income, while their debt in real terms stagnated or 
even increased modestly.6 
The first self-feeding loop: A second wave of non-performing loans 
In  the  context  of  high  unemployment,  exhausted  asset  buffers,  grave  uncertainty  and 
therefore low expectations of future income increases, this combination of debt reduction 
and  leverage  increase  has  a  great  impact  on  the  level  of  non-performing  loans.  The 
phenomenon is already observable in Greece but it is only in its initial phase in Spain, where 
the recovery in 2011 and a milder recession have not allowed it to take full effect. 
Figure 7. Ratio of bad loans by type in Greece (left) and Spain (right) 
 
Note: Data for Greece represent NPLs, for Spain ‘doubtful loans’. Due to a lack of harmonisation on bad loans by the ECB, 
definitions may differ and NPLs are not strictly equivalent to bad or doubtful loans. ‘NFCs’ stands for non-financial 
corporations. 
Sources: Bank of Greece, Bank of Spain and Eurostat. 
In this respect, the Greek case should serve as a cautionary example and a lesson for Spain 
and  other countries,  whose  non-performing household loans  could  threaten  the  financial 
system and public finance. Non-performing loans in Greece account for as much as 21.4% of 
total  loans,  while  households  register  delinquency  rates  of  19.9%  on  mortgages  and  an 
astonishing 35.6% on consumer credit in the second quarter of 2012. This compares with 
Spain’s 9.7%, 3.2% and 5.8%, respectively.7 
Greek household debt became yet another channel through which the vicious cycle of 
austerity translates into the broader economy . The drop in economic output caused by 
investment retrenchment, capital flight and  extensive attempts  at fiscal consolidation  left 
most of the  Greek population with severely -reduced income. This  prevented  them  from 
servicing fully their debts accumulated during the boom times, often beyond the capacity of 
their then official income due t o the high share of  the grey economy.8 Countries such as 
Spain  are  so far  managing to avoid  this threat  as far as household debt is concerned.  
However, a similar feed-back loop is already in effect in Spain on other levels, especially in 
loans taken on by the non-financial sector, which are delinquent in 15% of the cases. 
                                                           
6 C. Roxburgh, S. Lund, T. Daruvala and J. Manyika (2012), “Debt and deleveraging: Uneven progress on the path 
to growth”, McKinsey Global Institute, January. 
7 Numbers for Greece come from individualised compilations by the Bank of Greece. Recent data on Spain’s 
doubtful loans are available at http://www.bde.es. 
8 N. Artavanis, A. Morse and M. Tsoutsoura (2012), “Tax Evasion across Industries: Soft Credit Evidence from 
Greece”, Chicago Booth Research (12). 
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Greek delinquency rates have registered a surge since the beginning of the recession, while 
Spain’s  doubtful  loans  have  risen  merely  in  the  early  stages  of  the  Great  Recession  and 
relatively modestly. However, in recent quarters, the ratio of delinquency rates has been 
accelerating in both countries, thereby re-enforcing the trend observed in Greece, while in 
the Spanish case potentially signalling a second wave of delinquencies, similar to the one 
registered at the beginning of the crisis. 
Since the stock of loans of the Greek household sector is virtually identical to the amount of 
loans to non-financial companies and since the delinquency rates on mortgages are equal to 
those  on  business  loans,  NPL  rates  of  households  became  a  significant  part  of  financial 
instability in Greece, increasing recapitalisation needs of banks and ultimately the liabilities 
of the Greek state. The rise in liability occurs despite the fact that the Hellenic Financial 
Stability Fund, which serves as an intermediary, is a special purpose entity. These flexible-in-
size partial bailouts provided by European facilities contributed significantly to the dire state 
of Greece’s public finance and are in part responsible for breaches of the deficit limits set by 
the memorandum of understanding reached between the troika and the Greek government. 
Since breaches are usually followed by demands for further spending cuts and tax hikes, 
household disposable income is additionally decreased, further increasing the delinquency 
rates, and hence creating a partially self-feeding spiral through the financial system. 
Spanish households, on the other hand, have been extremely perseverant both in absolute 
and relative terms during the crisis and their role in destabilising the financial sector was 
therefore marginal. This is mainly due to the fact that large parts of the Spanish population 
inclined to take out housing loans (older and middle-aged couples) have been relatively 
spared the worst upheavals of the crisis. Their unemployment rates remain lower relative to 
other  population  groups  and  they  are  less  affected  by  budget  cuts  than  the  young  or 
unemployed. Also the fall in the interbank rates played a significant role in keeping the 
Spanish  mortgage  market  under  very  low  delinquency  levels,  as  the  low  rates  made 
mortgages both more affordable and easier to sustain (Figure 8). Households in Spain today 
save as much as 30% of monthly mortgage payments when compared to the initial date 
when the loan was taken.9   
Households still seem to be a rather low threat to Spanish credit institutions , compared to 
non-financial businesses, with mortgage delinquency rates staying below 3% throughout the 
crisis until the second quarter of 2012. Doubtful loans to businesses, on the other hand, have 
been soaring and they represent a major destabilising factor in the financial system. 
However, the second recession is starting to be reflected in the bad-loan rates of Spain (see 
Figure 7). The country could now be facing a significant rise in non-performing mortgages if 
unemployment of the most mortgage -exposed groups  rises, as the trend already suggests  
(Figure 9). If the economic situation deteriorates further, groups with the highest exposure to 
mortgage liability would be increasingly threatened by mass unemployment and other major 
income losses. The perseverance of Spanish households could thus hit a  threshold beyond 
which the credit markets would become a new channel for the crisis multiplier to take effect. 
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It is difficult to determine the critical threshold, since the freefall of economic output and 
loan performance in Greece does not give us a clear hint on when exactly the economic 
problems will spill over uncontrollably to mortgage-exposed parts of population. 
Figure 8. Three-month Euribor as a standard reference rate of Spanish 
mortgages 
 
Source: ECB. 
Since  the  beginning  of  the  second-dip  recession,  however,  it  is  becoming  clear  that  no 
segment of the Spanish population will be spared the slowdown. More importantly, due to 
structural  reforms  involving  labour-market  flexibility,  age  groups  previously  under 
advantageous labour provisions could become threatened by unemployment. If the trend is 
to continue, the role of the Spanish household debt could change abruptly and fiercely affect 
the financial sector and the economy (Figure 9). 
Figure 9. Unemployment in Spain by age groups 
 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística. 
The second self-feeding loop: Debt deflation and aggregate demand 
Non-performing loans appear to be the most immediate threat for the financial sector and for 
the  economy.  However,  a  much  more  menacing  element  of  the  current  development  of 
household debt lies in its potential to weaken aggregate demand to an extent that prevents a 
successful recovery. 
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This effect of household deleveraging would be in line with a rather heterodox, although 
recently revived, theory of debt deflation developed by Irving Fisher and Hyman Minsky.10 
Under this hypothesis, a shift in the perception of what constitutes a sustainable level of debt 
(linked to excessive debt and decreasing confidenc e of economic actors) leads to forced or 
natural deleveraging, which creates a drop in asset prices and thereby generates deflationary 
pressures in the economy. The real value of debt is  thus increased, making the debt burden 
less sustainable, triggering f urther deleveraging and creating a self -feeding loop of low 
aggregate demand, investment or both. 
Unless this vicious cycle is broken, the prospects of  swift  recovery remain low  for both 
households and non-financial businesses. This theory suggests that household deleveraging 
is not a sign of a recovery but an effective cause of  its sluggishness.11 Unless other sectors 
(state or businesses) are able to bear additional leverage in these periods,  a quick recovery 
becomes a near-physical impossibility. 
An alternative account of this phenomenon would revolve around uncertainty and consumer 
confidence. Low consumer confidence appears today to be one of the main motors of the 
rather swift deleveraging in Europe’s periphery and could also be a precursor of a more 
generalised fear of a long-term economic depression, since the expectations of recovery did 
not  materialise  and  uncertainty  has  been  increasing  steadily.  This  bad  mood  among 
consumers translates necessarily to levels of loans to non-financial corporations, which fear 
low  demand  and  postpone  or  retract  altogether  their  investments,  therefore  further 
diminishing the prospects of future growth. This sets the European continent into a low-
demand vicious circle with similar or identical effects as the debt deflation theory.  
Either way, such effects impose a serious strain on countries, which have not registered any 
significant asset bubble prior to the crisis and have thus theoretically avoided misallocation 
of capital. Indeed, there was nothing that could be identified as a genuine household-debt 
bubble in Portugal, with real indebtedness growing by as little as 25% from 2003 to its peak 
in 2010 (Figure 6). However, in terms of deleveraging, the country is firmly imbedded on the 
same path, although delayed, as more leveraged states, such as Spain. The Portuguese case 
shows us that deleveraging can be triggered in the absence of an asset bubble merely due to 
the recession, low consumer confidence and therefore low future income expectations. Also 
in many other countries, the current reduction of household debt appears to be a result of 
severely  depressed  economies  rather  than  an  adjustment  to  more  sustainable  debt  levels 
from speculative heights.  
Although deleveraging would be quicker under recovery, households may now be under 
pressure  to  increase  their  debt-reduction  efforts  beyond  the  elimination  of  the  pre-crisis 
excess credit, mainly due to the omnipresent narrative of necessary deleveraging. This has 
the  potential  to  trigger  excessively  deep  debt-reduction  in  the  short  term,  unnecessarily 
inflicting further harm to the economy. 
                                                           
10 I. Fisher (1933), “The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions”, The Econometric Society, 1(4), pp. 337–357 
and H. Minsky (1992), “The financial instability hypothesis”, The Jerome Levy Economics Institute Working 
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What can and cannot be done? 
Two broad policy responses offer the possibility to lessen the pressure on southern European 
households and diminish the probability that household debt has further depressing effects 
on the economy in the midst of a second-dip recession. Unfortunately, the most successful 
solution  is  near  to  impossible  to  come  into  force  under  current  political  and  economic 
constraints. 
We  have  learned  from  the  history  of  financial  crises  that  the  most  successful  cases  of 
deleveraging come in two phases: first, households and companies reduce their debt, while 
the  government  itself  takes  on  a  bigger  leverage  to  sustain  the  recovery  and  help  the 
economy  to  achieve  a  near-full  employment.  Subsequently,  when  the  economy  starts  to 
recover, the focus of deleveraging shifts towards the government, acting thus in a counter-
cyclical way. This mechanism is able to avoid self-feeding effects on the aggregate demand, 
unnecessary  deepening of  a  recession,  and significant  dead-weight  losses.  Unfortunately, 
Europe finds itself partly unable and partly unwilling to replicate such an ideal scenario. 
Long-term credible political commitments for deleveraging over a business cycle remain a 
hardly realisable plan also due to the institutional set-up of the European Union.  
However, there is a more feasible solution within the current institutional constraints, which 
could help households and the economy in Europe’s periphery to avoid unnecessary effects 
of ineffective household deleveraging. In order to avoid the further self-feeding phenomena 
related to households’ NPLs, it is necessary to break the link between weak sovereigns and 
the financial sector. This move is as urgent as it is economically justified in the case of Spain. 
Spanish households have managed reasonably well to avoid high delinquency rates on their 
own  liabilities,  while  they  remain  de  facto  liable  in  their  capacity  as  taxpayers  for  bad 
liabilities of other sectors.  
If Greek-type, self-feeding effects of household debt triggered by a second or a prolonged 
recession are to be avoided, especially in countries such as Spain, there must be safety nets 
for systemically important financial institutions far larger than the current national ones. 
However,  if  the  project  of  the  European  banking  union  and  most  importantly  its  bank 
resolution component is to be applied after the second wave of household defaults with no 
retroactivity  enshrined,  the  project  will  simply  fall  short  of  expectations  to  stop  the 
dangerous self-feeding effects of non-performing household loans.   
 
ECRI Commentaries provide short analyses of ongoing developments affecting 
credit  markets  in  Europe.  ECRI  researchers  as  well  as  external  experts 
contribute  to  the  series.  External  experts  are  invited  to  suggest  topics  of 
interest.  
 
Available for free downloading from the ECRI website (http://www.ecri.eu) 
ECRI © 2012. All rights reserved. 
European Credit Research Institute 
The  EUROPEAN  CREDIT  RESEARCH  INSTITUTE  (ECRI)  is  an  independent  research  institution 
devoted to the study of banking and credit. It focuses on institutional, economic and political aspects 
related to retail finance and credit reporting in Europe but also in non-European countries. ECRI 
provides expert analysis and academic research for a better understanding of the economic and social 
impact of credit. We monitor markets and regulatory changes as well as their impact on the national 
and international level. ECRI was founded in 1999 by the CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES 
(CEPS) together with a consortium of European credit institutions. The institute is a legal entity of 
CEPS  and  receives  funds  from  different  sources.  For  further  information,  visit  the  website: 
www.ecri.eu. 
ECRI Commentary Series 
ECRI Commentaries provide short analyses of ongoing developments with regard to credit markets 
in Europe. ECRI researchers as well as external experts contribute to the series. External experts are 
invited to suggest topics of interest for ECRI Commentaries. 
The Author 
Ales Chmelar is researcher at the European Credit Research Institute within CEPS in Brussels. He 
holds  a  Master  of  Science  from  the  London  School  of  Economics  and  a  Bachelor  of  Arts  from 
Sciences Po Paris. At ECRI he follows the credit developments in Europe and is in charge of the 
ECRI’s flagship publication, the Statistical Package on consumer credit and lending to households. 
 
 
ECRI Statistical Package 
Since  2003,  ECRI  has  published  a  highly 
authoritative, widely cited and complete set of 
statistics on consumer credit in Europe. This 
valuable  research  tool  allows  users  to  make 
meaningful  comparisons  among  all  27  EU 
member states and with a number of selected 
non-EU  countries,  including  the  US  and 
Canada.  For  further  information,  visit  the 
website: www.ecri.eu or contact info@ecri.eu.  
 
 
European Credit 
Research Institute (ECRI) 
Place du Congrés 1 
B-1000 Brussels, Belgium 
Tel.: +32-2-2293911 
Fax: +32-2-2194151 
Email: info@ecri.be 
Web: www.ecri.eu 
Disclaimer: The European Credit Research Institute is a sub-institute of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). The views expressed 
in this commentary do not necessarily reflect those of ECRI or CEPS’ members. 